Sobre la fundamentación lógica de la moral en la religión
- Statement of Responsibility:
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Romerales Espinosa, Enrique
- Hlavní autor:
- Formát:
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Journal article
- Jazyk:
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Spanish; Castilian
- Forma / Žánr:
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text (article)
- Vydáno:
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Universidad de León: Servicio de Publicaciones 1995
- V:
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Contextos ISSN 0212-6192 Nº 25-26, 1995, pags. 223-250
- Předmětová hesla:
- Annotation:
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According to recent approaches, which go back to Ockham, religion is the most adequate ground -or maybe the only possible one- for morality. There are three versions of this (divine command) theory. The first reduces morality to religion by identifying them, so that ¡t is not a genuine way of grounding morality. The second, due to R. Adams, asserts that religion, or better divine commands, are a sufficient -but not necessary- condition for morality. But in that case, if something more is needed in order for morality to appear, it is no longer a genuine grounding of morality on religion. The third, due to P. Quinn, claims that religion is only a sufficient condition for morality. But in not being necessary, morality could be independently grounded, so that divine commands appear redundant. In summary, such foundations, either are not genuinely theological, or else they are very implausible indeed.